The Maningrida region is culturally heterogeneous and administratively complex. Maningrida was established as a government settlement some 50 years ago, during an era when the assimilation of Aboriginal people into mainstream Australian society was official colonial settler state policy. From 1957, there were political tensions between local Aboriginal land owners and other Aboriginal groups; and between Aboriginal people and white administrators operating with very different social norms and notions of accountability, and with highly differentiated political power. While BAC was established in the immediate post-colonial period, when self-determination became official government policy, it has had to operate in a complex intercultural environment. While ostensibly BAC has a key role brokering on behalf of its membership with the Australian state, it also faces the complex challenge of mediating the diverse interests of its membership. These diverse Aboriginal interests are dynamic, transforming, and difficult to unambiguously demarcate-they are influenced by a complex system of land ownership, language (or multi-language), personal and group identity, shifting locational and family affiliations, and associated local political alliances.
The principal aim of this chapter is to explain how BAC has managed to effectively and simultaneously manage governance tensions between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal social norms and within its Aboriginal membership. This explanation is provided by tracing BAC's organisational history and its transformative, intercultural form of governance. The analytic explication seeks to identify some of the factors that have been critical to the governance and development success of BAC in effectively managing the tensions between western market-based and Indigenous kin-based social norms.
While history matters greatly in the BAC story, the focus here is primarily on the years since 1999. This is the time when formal governance emerged as a growing organisational issue. It is also a period in which the broader national Indigenous affairs environment has undergone some major transformations, with the abolition of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) in 2004 and the sudden declaration of the NT National Emergency Response in June 2007. These recent events provide an interesting book-ending of the nearly 30 year organisational existence of BAC.
The corporation was established to meet the emerging needs of the Maningrida region's growing outstations population. Today, those same needs exist, but the policy proposals announced in 2007 to abolish the two programs that have provided core funding to BAC by 30 June 2008 placed its future at considerable risk. This is a timely juncture to consider the vulnerability of a structurally dependent Aboriginal organisation (in what Rowse [2002] has termed 'the Indigenous sector') to the vagaries of policy change, irrespective of impressive performance, robust governance or the aspirations of membership. This in turn raises broader questions about the asymmetry of power relations in Australian society, the recent intolerance of the neoliberal state to cultural difference, and the extent that community governance and advocacy really matter for vulnerable Indigenous organisations.
A brief regional, social and historical background
The governance of Indigenous discrete communities is significantly influenced by their particular colonial histories and subsequent decolonisation experiences. The history of the Maningrida region needs some explication if we are to understand the background and operations of BAC. There is quite a significant literature about this region with key publications including Hiatt (1965) , Meehan (1982) , Altman (1987) and Gurmanamana, Hiatt and McKenzie (2002) .
The Maningrida region is loosely demarcated by a region bounded by the Liverpool River to the west, the Glyde River to the east and the Arnhem Land escarpment to the south. It is estimated to cover 10,000km 2 of tropical savanna. The regional population estimated in the 2006 Census is about 3,000, 162 being non-Aboriginal. 1 The region is extraordinarily linguistically diverse, with at least 10 distinct Aboriginal languages still in common usage in the region, besides Aboriginal English. And regional diversity is not just limited to languages. There are also variations evident in local and social organisation, religion and ritual, customary economies, art styles, and so on.
The region is extremely remote, even by Australian standards, located 500km east of Darwin and with only seasonal overland access. It is for this reason in part that it was colonised by the Australian state relatively late (Altman and Hinkson 2007 Significant effort and public funding was expended on the development of Maningrida from 1957. Under the policy framework of assimilation, the aim was to centralise, sedentarise and 'civilise' or Europeanise Aboriginal people in the region, a state project that proved extremely costly and unsuccessful, and which was abandoned in 1972. This failure of assimilation is an aspect of policy history that current neo-conservative writing conveniently overlooks (see e.g., Hughes 2007) . Even before 1972, there was a people's movement in the region that saw families return to live in small decentralised groups on their traditional lands. In doing so, they were rejecting the particular form of 'modernisation' offered at externally-controlled settlements and missions, and moving to live remotely with minimal support from the state. A conservative reading of history erroneously sees this decentralisation as just a product of the permissive and progressive shift to self-determination and land rights from 1972, whereas this social movement preceded these policy developments (Coombs 1974) . Decentralisation certainly accelerated as policy settings changed, but it may have happened anyhow owing to the failure of centralisation and the associated social tensions and extreme poverty experienced in Maningrida.
Fig. 7.1 Maningrida regional map
Elements of colonial discourse and associated ambiguities that remain today are notions of decentralisation and the term 'outstation', both of which are rarely used by Aboriginal people. Even the more modern terms, such as 'homeland communities' and 'return to country' (Blanchard 1987) , suggest that people left, voluntarily or involuntarily. An outstation conjures up a notion of an outpost from a settlement, whereas in reality, for the residents it is just a locality on the land that they either own or to which they have rights of residence owing to kinship or other customary criteria. Local Aboriginal people just use the place name for an outstation locality as in Fig. 7 .1, although when talking to outsiders generally prefer the term 'outstation' that I use here.
Maningrida was established because it was an administratively convenient locality near a fresh water spring at the mouth of the Liverpool River, on the land of the Dukurrdji clan. 
Theory, methods and caveats
There is a dominant theoretical supposition in the governance and development literature that good governance at the local level is imperative to poverty reduction and development more generally (Grindle 2004: 525) . This proposition has been theoretically and empirically examined in the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development (Cornell and Kalt 1995) , which has greatly influenced the Indigenous Community Governance Project (ICGP) in Australia.
From 1979, I have observed and then collaborated with BAC, but it was nearly 20 years on before I belatedly started asking the fundamental question, does governance really matter? Initially, I did this in a very partial way, focusing only on parts of BAC's operations. In 1998, I examined BAC as an ORA as part of a national review (Altman, Gillespie and Palmer 1999) ; in 1999, I produced a business development plan for Maningrida Arts and Culture (Altman 1999) ; and in 2000, I collaborated in a review of BAC as a CDEP organisation, but again focusing somewhat narrowly on the efficacy of this program (Altman and Johnson 2000) . The smoko room is an informal institution (to be differentiated from the more formal executive meetings held to accord with western incorporations law) because distinctly Indigenous social norms and codes of behaviour dominate in this setting. This institution is of crucial importance to BAC's sound governance. This is especially the case when local Aboriginal elites, with ascribed power based on seniority and customary authority, interact with the 'neo-elites' whose power is mandated through modernising processes (see Collman 1988) . A long time ago, Bagshaw (1977: 28) referred to the latter as balanda marringi (in the Burarra language), literally 'understanding whiteman' to be contrasted with gala marringi, the non-cognisant. 3 I labour this point to highlight that the smoko room provides opportunity for these two groups to interact productively. It is also noteworthy that outsider snapshots of such Aboriginal governance processes can be inadequate if they do not observe such informal institutions at work, although they can be difficult to interpret. 
A potted history of BAC's organisational evolution
In the early 1970s as the outstations movement gathered momentum in central Arnhem Land, Aboriginal people were increasingly empowered to return to live on their traditional lands. The exodus from Maningrida was one of the most significant from the NT's centralised Aboriginal settlements in population terms (see CAA 1976; Meehan 1982; Altman 1987) . Government policy at that time supported decentralisation and this in turn required organisational support, especially in the delivery of basic services: fortnightly delivery of social security cheques and commodities from the Maningrida store; assistance with basic external communications and the marketing of arts and crafts; and assistance with establishing rudimentary water reticulation in some situations. In those days, there were no standard western housing or ablution facilities at outstations.
Initially, this basic support was provided by the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, then by the Maningrida Progress Association, and then from 1976 by a branch of the Maningrida town council, called the Maningrida Outstation Resource Centre (see Gillespie, Cooke and Bond 1977) . The resource centre was staffed by three non-indigenous men-Dan Gillespie, Peter Cooke and David Bond-assisted by a number of local men, some now deceased. Gillespie and Cooke had lived in the region for some years and were strong advocates for land rights, the outstations movement and Aboriginal self-determination. At that time, a political dispute emerged within the Maningrida Council between these white staff of the resource centre dubbed 'progressives' and other 'conservative' senior staff of the Maningrida Council. While this division was between balandas (non-Aboriginal people) and was along party political lines, it also reflected a tension in the region between the township and outstations, and between those adhering to the old 'assimilation' regime that still had considerable influence in the township and those committed to the new 'self-determination' policy introduced in 1972. From 1989, BAC expanded to also become an organisation that administered the CDEP scheme. The growth of BAC as a CDEP organisation has been covered in some detail elsewhere (Altman and Johnson 2000) . This was an historic moment that marked a fundamental change in the nature of BAC for a number of reasons. First, while its early CDEP engagement was limited and mainly oriented to provide income support to outstation residents, its corporate robustness meant that this role expanded rapidly. This was especially the case after 1997 when BAC was invited by ATSIC to take over the Maningrida Council's CDEP scheme participants, owing to Council problems with maladministration at that time. Running CDEP meant that BAC had to rapidly expand its administrative and project management capacity, especially when it took over administering township based participants. Second, CDEP provided BAC with discretionary administrative and capital resources that it incrementally invested in developing a number of business and service arms. As a consequence of both these developments, BAC attained a far more visible Maningrida profile. Its earlier reputation as a best practice resource agency was now matched by a high reputation as a CDEP organisation, with associated external bureaucratic and political support.
From the late 1990s, about a decade after it gained access to the CDEP scheme, BAC entered another phase as a regional development agency. This phase is less easy to demarcate because it was linked to a gradual expansion of the organisation, which was largely overseen by a senior project officer, Ian Munro, appointed in 1991. Munro subsequently became BAC's deputy Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and from August 2005 its CEO. An analysis of BAC's consolidated financial accounts shows fairly marked increase in organisational turnover in the late 1990s, including in the administration of some significant grants for housing and infrastructure development at outstations, as well as a steady increase in the proportion of total income from trading activities (as distinct from CDEP grants from ATSIC). Organisational scale appears to have taken BAC onto a new level after its income exceeded $10 million in 1997-98 and then expanded by another 50 per cent by 1999-2000.
The fundamental changes in organisation were recognised in 1999 with a modification of its constitution to provide greater emphasis not just on service delivery functions, but also to support Aboriginal cultural priorities, promotion of the management and sustainable use of Aboriginal-owned lands and resources, the welfare of its members, and business opportunities and economic independence.
Recently, BAC (2005a: 4) defined its mission in accord with its constitution in the following terms:
At the regional level we act as a force for the political integration and representation of the interests of over 100 regional land owning groups [members of patrilineal clans] of our members … As a service delivery agency BAC provides cultural and natural resource management programs, essential municipal and social services and labour market and economic development opportunities to its members in Maningrida and surrounding outstation communities.
The maintenance of land, language(s) and culture, the sustainable use of natural resources and the creation of viable enterprises employing Aboriginal people are central themes in all of BAC's activities.
Its mission statement demonstrates that BAC recognises its evolution into an organisation that serves members living in both Maningrida and outstations, and often residing flexibly between the township and various locations in the hinterland. This in turn makes its goal of acting as a force for political integration highly problematic, as the basis, authority and contexts for such a role are largely undefined, and the political interests of its membership are highly variable.
Even at an organisational level, BAC is diverse and complex for an Aboriginal entity as Fig. 7 .2 illustrates. BAC has 20 formal business and service arms, with many combining the provision of services with a focus on commercial objectives and economic development possibilities.
A quick summary of BAC's published annual reports and audited financial statements for the last three years, 2004-05 to 2006-07, indicates that BAC employs over 500 CDEP participants-making it one of the country's largest CDEP organisations-and engages over 50 mainly non-Aboriginal salaried staff. Its turnover exceeds $25 million per annum, with well over 50 per cent generated from trading income and the balance coming from a number of external grants, the most significant being for the operation of CDEP (see BAC 2005a (see BAC , 2005b (see BAC , 2006a (see BAC , 2006b (see BAC , 2007a (see BAC , 2007b . 
Governance challenges
BAC is a distinctive form of organisation that is intercultural: its organisational governance has to accommodate both western legal requirements and Indigenous social norms and external and internal accountability. In BAC's case, this governance interculturality is further complicated by the scale of the organisation, its history and its transformations over time, from a focused ORA to a mixed and more diverse organisation that also operates as a CDEP organisation and development agency. These complexities are further complicated again by the extraordinary cultural and linguistic diversity of its Indigenous constituency, by differences between the needs and aspirations of members who reside in town and country, and by long-standing territorial disputes (some of which had their genesis in the 1970s) with other Maningrida organisations. Many of these governance challenges and tensions are not unique to BAC. In this section, I focus on just a few of a myriad of governance challenges that BAC faces.
A first-order issue for BAC is the challenges that its all-Aboriginal executive face. This executive is elected by secret ballot at the annual general meeting, with the chairman being the nominated candidate who attracts the most votes.
There is invariably a change of chairman from one year to the next and regular turnover in the composition of the executive. This makes executive decision making-which varies from the mundane to the multi-million dollar-difficult. This diversity of business is not unusual for committee-run organisations. For example, the executive has to be heavily involved in setting rules for CDEP, the dominant every day business, as well as in making investment decisions in relation to enterprises, and decisions about forms of new grant funding to be sought and new projects to pursue.
Two key challenges emerge here. First, the level of expertise needed to understand and oversee the operations of this complex conglomerate (see Fig.  7 .2) is significant. In a community like Maningrida there is a relatively small pool of Aboriginal people who have the requisite educational qualifications and understanding of business and corporate governance to undertake this task. Arguably, this is an indictment of the Maningrida education system, but also of the lack of opportunity for on-the-job education and training at BAC given its organisational longevity. The few who have such skills face pressures to participate on other boards, placing them in actual or potential conflict of interest and under considerable workload pressures. As BAC's constitution requires an annual spill of executive positions, it is unusual for any executive members to be consistently re-elected. This, as noted later, reflects the aspirations of members to share both the benefits and responsibilities of office among numerous regional interest groups. Consequently, new executive members need to be familiarised with corporate decision making processes on an annual basis and there is limited growth of capacity and ongoing executive expertise over time. Board training and induction takes time and the legal requirements facing members are onerous.
This in turn means that senior management has far greater knowledge about the running of BAC than the executive. In BAC's case, the divergence between the Aboriginal executive and the non-Aboriginal management expertise has been exacerbated by high turnover of executive membership and low turnover of senior management: BAC has only had three chief executive officers since 1979. Historically, this has resulted in a degree of executive apathy in actively engaging in organisational governance and BAC being vulnerable to the external perception that it is only governed by senior management rather than the Aboriginal executive. BAC's organisational complexity and the past reluctance of the executive to be actively involved in governance also pose a major challenge to management in finding the right balance between executive and member consultation, and a focus on implementation and action. In the past this resulted in too much governance by management, something that is in the process of changing.
BAC is incorporated under Australian law and so has requirements to comply with western, formal modes of governance as set out in incorporations statute. As a general rule, incorporations law requires that members of the executive operate impartially without vested interest and to meet the objectives of the corporation for the benefit of its membership. Gerritsen and Straton (2007: 166) refer to this western incorporations requirement as a 'weberian rationality of impersonal distribution'. Such modes of governance are very different from Aboriginal modes of governance that prioritise kin-based obligations and sectional interests. In the BAC case, these sectional interests are diverse and fluid, comprising members of one's household or extended kinship group, or members of one's language community or totemic cluster, or outstation co-residents. Aboriginal social norms see pressure continually applied to executive members to respond to demands of particular sectional interests.
There is an ongoing tension between senior managers, who more readily ascribe to western modes of governance and are highly aware of external accountability requirements, and Aboriginal executive members, who have variable understandings of external accountability, but are acutely aware and constantly reminded of internal accountability to the sectional interests and the Aboriginal priorities that they represent. Finding the right balance between corporate compliance and appropriate responsiveness to member priorities is a continual governance challenge. This challenge is exacerbated if non-Indigenous staff do not understand Indigenous kin-based social norms and fundamentally appreciate the nature of Aboriginal connections to, and responsibilities for, country.
Choosing which governance approach to emphasise implicates a process that Bagshaw (1977: 27) referred to as 'jural selectivity'. While BAC's objects are broadly defined to allow compliance with Aboriginal priorities, like ceremonial participation, there is an ongoing tension in making the resource allocation between competing priorities, while complying with external bureaucratic and internal membership accountability.
Within BAC's membership and generally within the elected executive, there is a mix of elites: those who enjoy status on the basis of Aboriginal customary criteria and those who gain status on the basis of western knowledge, Bagshaw's 'balanda marringi'. The poor outcomes from the Maningrida education system mean that there are relatively few with the requisite English literacy to be members of the neo-elite. While this relatively small cadre is now actively involved in organisational governance, as noted above a number are simultaneously members of several Maningrida-based (and external) organisations. Historically, BAC has under-invested in corporate governance training for its executive, in part because of high executive turnover and in part because suitable governance training has not been locally available. This in turn resulted in member apathy and disinterest in what was often (erroneously) viewed as 'balanda business', because of the way the organisation had been structured and run in the past.
Invariably, the BAC executive includes a mix of the customary elite and the more western-familiar neo-elite. Informal processes see cross-cultural tensions between western and Indigenous modes of governance being constantly played out, often in executive committee meetings or in the less formal 'smoko room' context described earlier. Western modes of governance require strict adherence to corporations law and external accountability, at least in principle. 5 The BAC executive neo-elites partially understand this, while Indigenous modes of governance require accountability to immediate family, broader kinship networks, language communities, ritual allies, co-residents and a myriad of other obligations with which executive members are encumbered. On occasion, an executive member belongs to both elites, and on other occasions elites and neo-elites form alliances in executive decision making.
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Organisational metamorphosis has presented BAC with new governance challenges. BAC's original raison d'etre was as an outstations support agency, consistently seek to bridge this cultural gulf by inviting key balandas onto their country and into ceremonies. 5 I say 'in principle' because of the historically high rate of corporate non-compliance (and associated potential for fraud and embezzlement) that has bedeviled Aboriginal organisations, especially in very remote localities. 6 This essentially heuristic distinction between elites and neo-elites overstates the relative roles and statuses of the two categories. The very use of the term neo-elite is a heuristic categorisation that is potentially problematic as it is contextually constituted in relation to both balandas and Aboriginal people, 'countrymen'. but as noted elsewhere (Altman and Johnson 2000) , its success first as a CDEP organisation and then as a development agency has provided more and more employment opportunities to its membership in Maningrida. Five-yearly census data indicate some drift of outstation residents into Maningrida over time, and while the reasons for this re-centralisation are complex, BAC's success is certainly one contributing factor.
This in turn has generated a new set of governance challenges. For example, BAC increasingly needs to maintain good patronage relations with the Dukurrdji traditional owners of Maningrida on whose lands its growing numbers of enterprises are located. This challenge has been addressed by the payment of lease rentals. Ultimately, BAC's success may offer too much opportunity for its membership in Maningrida (where all enterprises are located) rather than in the bush-a centralisation chain in-migration may result as kinship and sociality draw in the relatives of those finding opportunity in town. The logical consequence of this process is the abandonment and undermining of the culturally differentiated outstation communities in favour of a single culturally homogeneous (in relative terms) Maningrida population, whose younger members will become increasingly attenuated from their own lands and traditions. This will increasingly require BAC members to have multiple allegiances to both BAC and other Maningrida organisations that provide housing and other services. This creates challenges, as such multiple allegiances, mixed with notions of egalitarianism and risk minimisation, can create some ambivalence about BAC's regional dominance. In interview, two members of multiple boards emphasised to me that they did not want BAC to get 'too big'. It is also contrary to the original aims of the outstations movement. 
Adaptively managing governance tensions
The critical focus of my research is on understanding how western (incorporated) and customary (kin-based) forms of governance have been balanced in the operations of BAC. At one level, there has clearly been a successful mediation of these two quite different governance approaches. This is evidenced by the longevity of BAC, its growth and its success. At another level, historically there has been ready deferral to non-Aboriginal management, at least until recent times, which might suggest abrogation of governance responsibilities. What is remarkable about the BAC case is how these identified governance tensions have been astutely accommodated over a long period of time, while the organisation has experienced impressive growth and performance. In this section, I focus more specifically on the period since 2005 and what I have observed.
As noted earlier, the rapid growth of BAC in the 1990s was not matched by sufficient investment in organisational development. The new CEO, while a member of the senior management team since 1991, has embraced a greater focus on formal governance and has encouraged greater executive participation in the overall decision making for BAC. The strategy to change the governance balance to ensure greater membership participation has gained momentum. From 2004, BAC senior management moved to systematically address organisational deficiencies highlighted during strategic planning and incorporated in an action plan. In particular, executive committee members have been paid sitting fees and are expected to attend all meetings; the executive are involved more actively in agenda setting; more detailed records of meetings are maintained; and a number of members have participated in governance training. A survey of senior managers of four Maningrida-based organisations undertaken in mid 2005 suggested that they had all observed benefits from this governance training by the initial cohort of trainees-it provided participants with some understanding of corporate governance and financial management issues. Unfortunately, this training has only been provided on a sporadic basis owing to high staff turnover at the training centre, and in 2007 this training program was suspended.
Overall, in formal governance terms, BAC has adopted a far more transparent organisational culture in recent years: it has published annual reports of activities since 1999-2000, developed an Induction Manual (Johnson 2004) , and has provided cross-cultural training for its non-Indigenous staff since 2004. There is no doubt that at a formal level BAC is regarded highly by ORAC, and in 2004-05 it rated special mention as a best practice Indigenous organisation (ORAC 2006: 37) . BAC's formal processes are sound, financial audits are invariably unqualified, and the overall financial performance of the organisation is probably without parallel in a remote Indigenous community context.
What is equally important is to understand how intercultural checks and balances have been maintained, or how the apparent incommensurability between western and customary social norms have been mediated. This has occurred in three interdependent ways.
First, the annually elected executive comprises between 11 and 15 representatives affiliated with different outstations and language groups. Turnover of executive members ensures that there is no dominance by one section of the regional membership and this is recognised as beneficial to the entire membership. The executive is invariably made up of members of the elite and the neo-elite, and in executive meetings and through informal institutions such as meetings in the 'smoko' room, consensus is reached on key policies and decisions like the allocation of new housing. It is not uncommon for non-executive members to attend such meetings as observers, in accord with customary decision making processes.
The position of chairman is important as this is a salaried position that also provides access to a highly valued chairman's vehicle (when one is available). This prestigious position is invariably rotated on an annual basis, even though it is based on a secret ballot and is generally shared equitably between a number of language communities. In July 2006, the incumbent chairman identified the rapid turnover of his position as a potential problem for BAC and indicated a desire to possibly seek re-election, but this did not eventuate.
Second, there is careful negotiation of the tensions between customary obligations and legal compliance between non-Indigenous senior managers and members of the Indigenous executive. Much of BAC's corporate success and sound governance can be sheeted home to the stability of its non-Indigenous senior management and seamless succession. Effectively, after the first executive officer established BAC in 1979-80, there have been only two more: one from 1980 to 2005, and the next from September 2005 (who was appointed after 14 years with the organisation since 1991). Such continuity and succession is extraordinarily important, especially in a corporate environment where the Indigenous executive is only appointed for a period of 12 months at a time. BAC's organisational history and culture has ensured that senior managers have been appropriately attuned to the aspirations of BAC's membership. Importantly, as BAC's organisational scale and capacities have grown, there have been sufficient numbers of senior managers to ensure checks and balances on management decision making. As noted earlier, BAC is not averse to extra-regional scrutiny and constructive criticism, much of which emanates from a healthy organisational engagement with external, at-arms-length, independent research bodies.
Third, BAC executive and senior managers in particular retain an open-door policy whereby individuals have good access to discuss personal, family and outstation issues and priorities. This approach makes an important contribution to ensuring that governance is transparent and facilitates early detection and correction of any policy errors or misallocations. While this open-door approach is demanding and often appears time inefficient, it is something BAC has made into a virtue. As a general rule, there is an expectation that senior staff are prepared to commit to this governance mechanism.
None of this is intended to suggest that BAC's operations are either tension or error free. From time to time, the social norms of customary governance take precedence and there have been disputes over unauthorised vehicle use and inappropriate use of order books, usually associated with ceremonial or funeral expenses. But as a general rule, these incidents are relatively rare; they are sometimes resolved by adapting existing procedures and usually by ensuring repayment of any outstanding advances. It is not unusual for the informal institution of public shaming to be invoked when excesses occur among members of the executive. Similarly, tensions can erupt between managers of business units, for they too need to compete for an equitable share of BAC resources. At times these can be mediated and resolved, at other times a manager may resign or be dismissed. The governance of an intercultural organisation like BAC is difficult and systems can break down. Over time, and especially in recent years, BAC has ensured that the fiscal bottom line is maintained, while enterprise innovation and associated risk is encouraged.
A critical, and at times highly problematic, challenge that has been highlighted is that long-term managerialism has probably inhibited Aboriginal executive decision making. It is too easy to highlight BAC's success and longevity as a 'business enterprise' and to overlook its lack of success in genuinely representing and empowering its Aboriginal membership. The particular form of governance that operates at BAC is intercultural and hybrid. To retain its historic success as an organisation it will need to be increasingly adaptive and creative as it continues to address the re-alignment challenges posed by its need to operate effectively between western and Aboriginal worlds.
Recent external threats
BAC has operated successfully for nearly 30 years in a remote and difficult context where governance is influenced by competing western and Indigenous social norms. It provides an exemplary case of how such competing social norms can be negotiated and managed.
Yet in the last three years since the abolition of ATSIC in 2004, BAC faced a series of threats from the now defeated Howard Government. At one level, these threats were linked to changed Commonwealth policy emphases and BAC's dependence on Commonwealth programs, especially CDEP and the Community Housing and Infrastructure Program (CHIP), which funds municipal services for outstations. At another level, these threats were highly political, with federal politicians and bureaucrats seeking to determine, in accord with the ideological fashion of the day, what was best for BAC and its membership even if this was in direct opposition to the aspirations of BAC's elected executive and members. Elsewhere, I have termed this approach 'remote managerialism' (Altman 2005a Altman 2005a) . At the heart of this dispute were radically different views about the appropriate economic future for BAC's membership. The unrealistic view from Canberra was that mainstream employment, so called 'proper jobs', should be the long-term goal for all in the Maningrida region. BAC's objects, on the other hand, emphasise a different notion of development that is realistic and grounded and incorporates the high degree of flexibility that matches its members' aspirations-BAC has quite proactively adopted the 'hybrid economy' model (Altman 2001 (Altman , 2005b as encompassing its approach.
A syndrome marked by unnecessary tension seems to pervade relations between the bureaucracy and successful Aboriginal organisations, which goes beyond the current neoliberal hegemony. On the one hand, the bureaucracy relies on organisations like BAC to deliver the limited successes that have been achieved in Indigenous development in the last three decades. On the other hand, there is a palpable feeling of enmity toward successes like BAC at many levels of the bureaucracy. Success seems to attract criticism, increased scrutiny, and cynicism rather than praise and championing. It is clear that without its considerable asset base, without funding for outstations support, and without a CDEP workforce of 550 and associated administrative resourcing, BAC would cease to exist as the significant regional development agency it has become. BAC 's (2007a, 2007b ) most recent audited financial statement and annual report indicate that it is a profitable $27 million per annum organisation. All this was to be jeopardised by the Australian Government's emergency intervention and new draconian laws. However, the change of government appears to have given BAC a reprieve, at least in the immediate term.
Governance for difference: analytic explication
There is a considerable literature in Australia that highlights the ambiguity embedded in the notion of an Indigenous jurisdiction (Collman 1988; Rowse 1992 Rowse , 2007 Sullivan 1996) ' (1977: 27) as a means of coping with the ambiguities inherent in post-colonial township living. Jural selectivity involved choosing between traditional Aboriginal law and European law to cope with any given social situation. As a Nakkara informant put it to Bagshaw: 'now we have two ways … angugalia [Aboriginal] and balanda [European] to fix our problems'. Bagshaw's was an early expression of the notion that was later termed interculturality, which can be understood as the complex processural manifestations of difference and inter-influence in situations of transformation (Hinkson and Smith 2005: 160) .
Recently, and again referring to Maningrida (but no particular organisation), Gerritsen and Straton (2007: 166) highlight an apparent incongruence between what they term 'the weberian rationality of impersonal distribution' that dominates western governance and Indigenous kin-based competitiveness. They suggest that policy makers provide funding to Aboriginal organisations with the mistaken belief that Aboriginal social norms ensure egalitarian sharing. Their perspective recognises a mix of 'traditional culture' and 'western power and logic' in Maningrida, but nevertheless focuses only on intra-Aboriginal tensions in heterogeneous communities marked by hierarchy, divisions and competition that precludes the likelihood of social cooperation. Gerritsen and Straton's (2007) analysis can be juxtaposed with Bagshaw's. For Bagshaw, state intervention and control resulted in Aboriginal participation being crowded out by the domination of white management, while white management does not even figure in Gerritsen and Straton's analysis.
Writing about central Australia and using a Foucauldian framework, Batty (2005) focuses on the effective working relationships that have emerged between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people involved in the state project of self-determination. In his analysis, Batty highlights that these partnerships develop into sites of administrative and cultural mediation that accommodate the aspirations of both Aboriginal people and the state. Batty (2005: 220) suggests that one of the unintended consequences of the policy of self-determination was the formation of a 'more or less permanent class of white advisers whose position and effectiveness depended almost entirely on partnerships with Aboriginal people'. 7 Elsewhere (Altman 2005b: 129) , I have broadly concurred with Batty's partnership framework, but construe it a little differently in the BAC case. Here there are a series of partnerships: between white management and Aboriginal executive; within the senior management team, to provide the checks and balances that will militate against possible excesses often associated with monopoly management; and within the elected executive, which needs to constantly negotiate a degree of accommodation between diverse Aboriginal township and regional interest groups.
The analysis undertaken here recognises the tension between kin-based and market-based (or indigenous and western) governance orders and traces how creative organisational adaptations have been made to address such apparent structural incongruity.
Part of the explanation of BAC's success is the long-term relationships that have formed between a small number of trusted senior white managers, who have stayed for long periods and have understood Aboriginal social norms based on kinship obligations, and constantly churning Aboriginal executives. The annual changes in the composition of executives have ensured that no one sectional interest in the Maningrida region has been politically dominant, while the longevity of white management has facilitated administrative and cultural mediation between western and customary social norms.
Another important element is the particular history and politics of the organisation. From the outset, BAC was established to support Aboriginal aspirations to live on their country, to gain access to state income support and to pursue market opportunities compatible with remote outstation living. The culture and associated governance of BAC has always been politically allied to a particular section of the regional population: outstation residents. The white staff of BAC (and its predecessor) championed Aboriginal self-determination and emphasised practical aspects of meeting such Aboriginal aspirations. From the outset, BAC has been structured to accommodate diverse Aboriginal aspirations and differences, the commercial and the cultural. BAC has also been a thoroughly intercultural organisation, accommodating from the outset both western and Aboriginal social norms, while providing space for effective management by trusted whites. The ability of Aboriginal people to retain key balandas for long periods of time is fundamental to its success.
BAC effectively facilitates livelihoods that are dependent on the customary or non-market sector, on state support, and on successful engagement with the market (see BAC 2007b). BAC also recognises that its members might participate in all three sectors of the hybrid economy and the interdependencies between these sectors that are mainly underwritten by the CDEP scheme. BAC delivers a local form of 'cultural match' that allows its membership to readily move between outstation and township living, while actively engaging in different forms of livelihood possibilities. Over time, BAC has evolved into a hybrid intercultural organisation (Altman and Cochrane 2003) whose objects and actions clearly recognise the highly flexible nature of local hybrid economies (Altman 2001) . The parallels between this hybrid institutional framework and the hybrid economy are at the heart of BAC's success.
A final reflection
It would be nice to conclude this chapter here because it seems that, as an organisation, BAC has strengthened its institutional capacities and its adaptively managed governance is robust. In a policy sense, BAC is an important case because it is a clear success in a broader narrative of Indigenous failure dominant in recent years. Yet, as noted above, each of its core organisational components-outstations, CDEP and appropriate development that accords with local aspirations-are currently under threat from the NT intervention and the new state project of normalisation. Unfortunately, BAC has remained dependent on the state and hence it is highly vulnerable to changes both in policies and in laws. For nearly 30 years, BAC has provided its membership effective 'governance for difference', but this has been threatened in recent times by the Howard Government's attempts to impose 'governance for sameness'. The BAC case shows that it is possible to govern to meet both western and Aboriginal requirements-cross-cultural congruence is possible. However, if cultural difference is not tolerated by the state, then power asymmetry can undermine and ultimately destroy intercultural projects, irrespective of their success. Or can it?
In early 1978, just five years after self-determination became official Commonwealth policy, the federal Minister for Aboriginal Affairs in the Fraser Coalition Government intervened to revoke the permits of three non-Indigenous staff working for outstations, despite the protestations of local Aboriginal people. At that time, recourse to the Supreme Court of the NT was available to challenge the Minister's decision, which was judged illegal and overturned. These people were empowered by the Australian legal system to return to Maningrida.
As this chapter is being completed, BAC is a joint plaintiff (with Maningrida traditional owners Reggie Wurridjal and Joy Garlbin) in an action in the High Court of Australia, which is challenging the authority of the Commonwealth to seize its assets without just terms compensation and so to undermine its organisational viability. The Commonwealth has always been empowered to terminate BAC's access to the CDEP scheme, despite its obvious success in administering this program since 1989. The change of Federal Government on 24 November with an election commitment to retain the CDEP scheme will see a reversal in some recent destructive policy proposals and in BAC's fortunes. Ultimately, the demise or survival of BAC might always be determined by wider ideological and political processes. But it says a great deal for the robust intercultural governance of BAC that its membership, executive, management and staff have effectively taken the fight up to the Australian state during the last three years to fight for its survival, in the name of 'governance for difference'.
